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This study empirically extends the Tiebout hypothesis of 'voting with one's feet' 
in two ways. First, it provides updated estimates using net migration data for the 
period 2000-2008. Second, in addition to investigating variables reflecting public 
education outlays, property taxation and income taxation, it investigates whether 
migrants are attracted to states with higher Medicaid benefits per recipient. The 
latter hypothesis is referred to as the 'Medicaid magnet hypothesis'. The analysis 
includes three economic variables, three quality of life variables and three 
Tiebout-type factors in addition to Medicaid benefits. Empirical results indicate 
that consumer voters were attracted to states with higher per pupil public school 
spending, lower property and income tax rates, and that certain consun1er-
voters may be attracted to states that offer higher levels of Medicaid benefits. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Determinants of U.S. internal migration are a topic of 
significant research interest as evidenced by Percy et al. 
(1995);   Saltz   (1998);   Milligan    (2000);   Conway   and 
Houtenville (2001, 2003), Knapp et al. (2001); Rhode 
and Strumpf (2003); Chi and Voss (2005); Cebula and 
Alexander (2006); Francis (2007); Landry et al. (2007), 
and Kennan and Walker (2010). 
One of the migration issues receiving the greatest atten- 
tion involves the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis, sometimes 
referred to as either the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis, or 
simply 'voting with one's feet'. It was hypothesized by 
Tiebout (1956, p. 418) that 'the consumer-voter may be 
viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his 
preferences for public goods ... the consumer-voter 
1noves to that community whose local government best 
satisfies his set of preferences'. Tullock (1971, p. 917) 
observes that this hypothesis can be extended such that 
the 'individual deciding where to live will take into 
account the private effects upon himself of the bundle of 
government services and taxes'. Thus, Tullock (197l), 
perhaps more expressly than Tiebout (1956), emphasizes 
that the consumer-voter evaluates both the government 
goods and services and the tax burden at potential end 
locations of choice. 
This study extends the Tiebout hypothesis in two 
ways. It provides updated estimates using net migration 
data for the period 2000-2008 and in addition to invest- 
igating variables reflecting per pupil public education 
outlays, effective property tax rates and effective 
income tax rates, it investigates whether migrants are 
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attracted to states with higher Medicaid benefits per 
recipient. We refer to this behaviour as the 'Medicaid 
magnet hypothesis'. States with higher Medicaid bene- 
fits per recipient attract persons who·either are already 
receiving Medicaid, who are Medicaid-eligible or 
expect to become Medicaid-eligible in the foreseeable 
future. These states act like magnets to the Medicaid 
constituency and induce an influx of migrants. State 
governments offering higher Medicaid benefit levels 
per recipient inay also be preventing out-1nigration 
from their own state of residents who are either already 
receiving Medicaid benefits, are Medicaid-eligible or 
expect to become Medicaid-eligible. 
The Medicaid magnet hypothesis and the empirical 
investigation thereof are 1notivated in part by the observa- 
tion noted by Holahan (2007, p. 667) that 'There is great 
variation among states in Medicaiq _spending per low- 
income person', a fact documented some time ago by 
Holahan and Liska (1997). Moreover, this extension of 
the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis can be regarded as some- 
thing of a derivative of the debate regarding  welfare 
migration in Sommers and Suits (1973); Paek (1973); 
Glantz (l 974); Southwick (1981); Cebula and Belton 
(1994); Levine and Zi1mnerman (J 999), and Kennan and 
Walker (2010). 
This contemporary study of the Medicaid magnet 
hypothesis extension adopts state-level data  for  the 
United States and deals with net state in-migration rate 
detern1inants for the period 20002008. The adoption of 
state-level data, as opposed to city- or county-level data, to 
investigate the Tiebout hypothesis follows previous stu- 
dies (Cebula and  Belton, 1994; Saltz, 1998; Gale and 
Heath, 2000; Conway and Houtenville,  2001;  Cebula 
and Alexander, 2006; Kennan and Walker, 2010). 
Numerous studies have empiricalJy addressed determi- 
nants of U.S. internal migration. A number of these studies 
emphasize the migration impact not only of economic and 
fiscal factors but also 'quality of life' factors, as in Saltz 
(1998); Conway and Houtenville (1998, 2001, 2003), 
Gale and Heath (2000); Milligan (2000); Knapp et  al. 
(2001), and Cebula and Alexander (2006). As demon- 
strated in these studies, the omission of noneconomic 
factors fro1n an  empirical  inigration  analysis  constitutes 
an omitted-variable problem that generally compromises 
the integrity of that analysis. As a consequencei our cur- 
rent article includes not only fiscal factors and purely 
economic factors but also a number of quality of  life/ 
a1nenity  factors. 
 
 
 
II. Framework 
 
The consumer-voter  is treated as viewing  the migration 
decision as an investment decision such that the decision 
R. j.  Cebula and f . R. Clark 
to migrate from area i to area j requires that his/her 
expected net discounted present value of migration from 
area i to area}, DPVij, be both (a) positive and (b) the 
maximum net discounted present value that can be 
expected  from moving  fron1 area i to any other known 
and plausible  alternative area U). Because of the fact that 
this study uses net state in-migration, issues such as dis- 
tance and moving costs are obviously 01nitted fro1n the 
computation of the DPVij. 
Accordingly, following the models in Tiebout (1956); 
Tullock (1971); Riew (1973); Renas (1983); Vedder et al. 
(1986), and Cebula and Alexander (2006), among others, 
DPVij consists in this study of three broad sets of con- 
siderations, namely 
 
(1) Economic conditions in those areas 
(2) Fiscal factors in those areas 
(3) Quality oflife factors in those areas 
 
Logically, migration will flow from area ito areaj only if 
 
 
DPVij > O; and DPVij = MAX forj, where} 
(!) 
= 1i 2i . . . , z 
 
where z represents all of the plausible known alternative 
locations to area i. Given the focus in this study on state 
migration, areas i and} are states i and). 
This study empirically investigates not only the stan- 
dard Tiebout (1956) hypothesis of voting with one's feet 
but also an extension of that hypothesis, namely, what is 
herein referred to as the 'Medicaid magnet hypothesis'. 
We argue that states providing higher levels of Medicaid 
benefits per recipient potentially attract migrants from 
other states, where lower levels of' Medicaid benefits per 
recipient are being provided. These migrants consist of 
those who either are already receiving Medicaid benefits, 
who are Medicaid-eligible or expect to become Medicaid- 
eligible in the foreseeable future. Thus, states offering 
higher levels of Medicaid benefits per recipient can induce 
a positive flow of· in-niigration. Furthermore, those states 
offering the higher/highest Medicaid benefit levels per 
recipient may also be preventing out-migration of resi- 
dents of the attracted cohort. Thus, net state in-migration 
is an increasing function of the level of Medicaid benefits 
per  recipient 
To measure the migration rate, M!Gj, the net number of 
in-migrants to statej over the period July 2000-July 2008 
expressed as apercent of the year 2000 population in state 
j, is adopted. A positive (negative) net in-migration indi- 
cates that more (fewer) migrants entered the state than left 
the state during the time frame studied. Since this study 
provides an estimate in semi-log form as well as estimates 
in linear form, the dependent variable (net in-migration) is, 
in the semi-log estimate, expressed as follows: first, the net 
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number of in-migrants to each state over the period July 
2000-July 2008 is divided by tbe population in each state 
for the year 2000; second, that figure, which is a decimal 
with a value between -LO and +1.0, depending upon the 
state, is added to +1 .0 in order to guarantee a positive 
value for the net in-migration rate for each of the states; 
finally, the resulting figure is converted to a percent and 
tben into natural log fonn. 
To ineasure economic conditions in state ), three vari- 
ables are adopted, altbough, technically, the first variable 
listed below integrates two typically separated economic 
variables; 
 
(1) EMFIN CJ is the year 2000 nominal median family 
income in state), MFJNCj, multiplied by ( l-UNj), 
where UNj is the unemployment rate of the civilian 
labour force in the year 2000 in statej, expressed as 
a decimal; thus, (1-UNj) is tile employment rate of 
the civilian labour force in state j (expressed as a 
decimal) and the product of MFINCj and (1-UNj), 
EMFINCj, is treated as a measure of expected 
family income/wage  prospects  in  state j  insofar as 
it includes not only a measure of income in  each 
state but also the probability of obtaining a job in 
each state (Saltz, 1998); in any case, net in-migra- 
tion is expected to be an increasing function of 
EMFINCj. 
(2) COSI] measures the overall cost of living in state j 
for t11e average four-person family in the year 2000; 
COSI] is  expressed  as   an   index,   with 
COSI] 1  00.00 being the mean value of 
COSI]. Net in-migration is expected to be a 
decreasing function  of COSI]. 
(3) EMPGRj is the percentage growth rate of employ- 
ment in nonfarm establishments in state j over the 
period paralleling the migration flow from 2000 to 
2008. Given the contemporaneous nature of the net 
migration and employment growtb variables, two- 
stage least squares (2SLS) is the estimation techni- 
que adopted in this study. The inclusion of a vari- 
able such as EMPLGRj is based on Vedder et al. 
(1986) and Cebula and Alexander (2006), where net 
in-n1igration is found to be an increasing function of 
EMPGRj. 
 
To measure fiscal factors, four variables are adopted, one 
of which reflects the Medicaid magnet extension to the 
Tiebout hypothesis: 
 
(1) EFSINCTXRATEJ is the year 2000 average effective 
percentage  state inconJ.e tax rate in state j,  which 
over the years has often been overlooked, although 
it has been taken into consideration more recently by 
Cebula (1990); Gale and Heath (2000), and Conway 
and Houtenville (1998, 2001, 2003). Conventional 
wisdom (Riew, 1973) would argue that a higher 
level of EFSINCTXRATEj would be expected to 
discourage  net  in-migration. 
(2) EFPROPTXRATE j, the average effective property 
tax rate in statej, i.e., the average effective city plus 
county property tax rate in state/ in the year 2000. 
Some measure of property taxes has previously 
been considered by Liu (1977);  Gale and Heath 
(2000); Conway and Houtenville (2001);  Rhode 
and Strumpf (2003), and Cebula and Alexander 
(2006) in tbc migration studies of a Tiebout-type 
framework, altbough usually in tbe form of per 
capita property taxes. Based on the conventional 
wisdom (Riew, 1973), a higher property tax rate 
(EFPROPTXRATEj ) is expected to dissuade net in-
migration. 
(3) The variable PPUP!Lj is tbe nominal outlay in state 
j per pupil on primary and secondary public  educa- 
tion in the year 2000. PPUP!Lj replaces tbe more 
commonly adopted variable per capita public edu- 
cation outlays examined by Pack (1973); Cebula 
(1979); Renas (1980); Conway and Houtenville 
(1998, 2001 ), Gale and Heatb (2000), and Rhode 
and Stnnnpf (2003); a higher  level of PPUP!Lj is 
expected  to  encourage  net in-migration. 
(4) MEDICAIDPR) is the nominal average Medicaid 
outlay per Medicaid recipient in state j in the year 
2000, In accordance with the Medicaid magnet 
hypothesis, net in-n1igration is expected to be an 
increasing  function  of MEDICAIDPRj. 
 
Finally, to measure quality of life conditions, tbe focus is 
on tbe following three variables: 
 
(1) JANTEMPJ is the mean January temperature in state 
j (l971-2000), as a measure of warmer climatic 
conditions in state j. As in so many migration stu- 
dies, including Clark and Hunter (1992); Conway 
and Houtenville (1998, 2001); Gale and Heath 
(2000), and Cebula and Alexander (2006), tbis vari- 
able or a close substitute for the san1e, such as 
heating degree days, is adopted as a quality of life 
control variable for climate. It is expected tbat a 
warmer  climate  is likely to  increase  the net inflow 
of migrants. 
(2) COASI] is a dununy variable to reflect whetber state 
j directly borders on eitber tbe Atlantic Ocean, the 
Gulf of Mexico or the Pacific Ocean. COASI] 1 if 
state j borders on one or more of tbese bodies of 
water and COASTj = 0 otherwise. The expected 
in1pact of this variable on net in-1nigration is posi- 
tive (Cebula and Alexander, 2006). 
(3) DENSITY} is the population density in statej, mea- 
sured as the nu1nber of persons per square 1nile in 
state j  in tbe year 2000. To tbe extent that greater 
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population density implies greater crowding and 
congestion, it is expected that net in-1nigration is a 
decreasing function of DENSITY;' (Cebula and 
Alexander,  2006). 
R. /. Cebula and f. R. Clark 
Based on the arguments in the previous section, the 
fOllowing coefficient signs (ceteris paribus ) are 
hypothesized: 
Ill. The Migration Model 
 
Based upon the eclectic model developed in the preceding 
section, the reduced-fonn equations to be estimated initi- 
ally are given by Equations 2 and 3: 
 
MIGj = ao + a 1EMFINCj + a2 COSTj + a3EMPLGRj 
+ a4EFSINCTXRATEj + a5EFPROPTXRATEj 
+ a,PPUPILj + a,MEDICAIDPRj + a sHDDj 
+ a9COASTj + a1 0DENSITYJ  + u (2) 
 
 
lnMJGj = b0  + b 1 EMFINCj + b2 COSTj + b3EMPLGRj 
+ b,EFSJNCTXRATEj  + bsEFPROPTXRATEj 
+ b6PPUPILj + b,MEDICAIDPRj + bsHDDj 
+ b9COASTj + b10DENSITYj + u' (3) 
 
 
where lnM!Gj    the natural log of MJGj; a 0, b0      constant 
te1n1s; u, u ' = stochastic error te1ms. 
The study includes all 50 states. The expression of the 
exp1ar1atory variables (other than EMPLG.Rj ) in year 2000 
levels is based on Greenwood  (1978), who argues that use 
of beginning-of-period values  for right-hand-side variables 
helps to avoid simultaneity bias. The data sources for all of 
the variables in the analysis are provided in Table 1. Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics. Table  3 provides a correla- 
tion matrix for the explanatory variables, where serious 
multicollinearity  problems  are not evident. 
 
 
 
Table I. Data sources 
 
                     (4A) 
 
bi  > O,b2  < O , b3 > O, b4 < O , bs < O , b, > O,b, > 0, 
bs < 0, b9 > 0, b10 < 0 (4B) 
 
Given that the net migration variable M!Gj and the expla- 
natory variable EMPLGRj are contemporaneous in this 
specification, the  possibility of simultaneity bias (two- 
way  causality)  clearly  exists  (Liu,   1977;  Greenwood, 
l 978; Partridge and Rickman, 2006). Accordingly, the 
model is to be estimated by 2SLS.  The instrument  for 
the EMPLGRj variable (which refers to the period 2000- 
2008) is the previous-period (1996-2000) percentage 
growth rate of employment in nonfarm establishments in 
state j, PREVEMPLGPRj. The choice of instrument is 
based on the findings that it is highly correlated with the 
explanatory variable, EMPLGPRj, while being uncorre- 
lated with the error terms in the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
IV.   Initial Estimations 
 
The 2SLS estimations of Equations 2 and 3 are provided in 
columns (a) and (b), respectively, of Table 4. In column 
(a), all ten of the estimated coefficients exhibit the 
expected signs, with five statistically  significant  at the 
1% level, two statistically significant at the 2.5% level, 
and  three  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level.  In 
 
Variable Source 
 
MIG 
EMF/NC 
COST 
EMPLGR 
EFSINCTXRATE 
EFPROPTXRATE 
PPUPIL 
MEDICAIDPR,  MAX MEDICAIDPR 
COAST 
DENSITY 
JANTEMP 
ECONFREE 
POLL UT 
PCPROPTX 
PCSINCTX 
PREVEMPLGPRj 
U.S. Census Bureau (2010, Tables  12, 15) 
U.S. Census Bureau (2001, Table 606; 2002, Table 656) 
ACCRA (2001) 
U.S. Census Bureau (2010, Table 604) 
U.S. Census Bureau (2005, Table 455, 2002, Table 656) 
U.S. Census Bureau (2003, Table 446, 2005, Table 955) 
U.S. Census Bureau (2001, Table 242) 
U.S. Census Bureau (2010, Table 145) 
binary (0, 1) dummy variable 
U.S. Census Bureau (2005, Table 13) 
U.S.  Census  Bureau  (2002,  Table 363) 
Ruger  and  Sorens (2009, p.  47) 
American Lung Association (201 1 ) 
U.S. Census Bureau (2003, Table 455, 2005, Table 17) 
U.S. Census Bureau (2003, Table 455, 2005, Table 17) 
U.S. Census Bureau (2002, Tables 644, 17); and U.S. Census Bureau (2010, Table 604) 
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EMFJNC 38 836 5761 In  tbe  quality  of  life  variables,  the  coefficient  on 
COST 100.00 10.404 .JANTEMP is positive and statistically significant at the 
EMPLGR 1.323 
2.397 
1% level in both estimate (a) and estimate (b). This sug- 
EFS!NCTXRATE 2.8977 1.9619 
EFPROPTXRATE 2.5877 2.9421 gests that environ1nents having wanner clitnates are more 
 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics 
 
Va1iable Mean SD 
MIG 1 0.957 50.57 
coefficient on the EMPLGR variable is positive and statis- 
tically significant at the I% level in both estimates (a) and 
(b), leading to the inference that migrants prefer to move to 
states with higher employment growth rates. 
PPUPIL 7111 1591 
MEDICAJDPR 4292 1233 
JANTEMP 32.71 12.65 
COAST 0.40 0.49 
DEN51TY 254 344 
ECONFREEDOM 0.04 0.22 
POLL UT 55.92 23.74 
PCSJNCTX 623.92 373.02 
PCPROPTX 458.91 570.66 
 
 
 
addition, the F-statistic is significant at the 2.5% level, an 
indication of the overall strength of the model. 
In estimate (b), all ten of the estimated coefficients once 
again exhibit the hypothesized signs, with four statistically 
significant at the I % level, two statistically significant at 
the 2.5% level, three statistically significant at the 5% level 
and one statistically significant at beyond the I 0% level. 
The F-statistic is significant at the 2.5% level in this 
esti1nate, once again reflecting the strength of the model. 
The estimated coefficient on the incon1e variable 
(EA1FllVC) is positive and statistically significant at 
beyond the 2.5% level in both estimates (a) and (b). In 
addition, the estimated coefficient on the cost of living 
variable (COSI) is negative and statistically significant at 
the l % level in both estimates (a) and (b). Combined, these 
results iinply that the net state in-migration rate was an 
increasing function of no1ninaJ expected median family 
income and a decreasing function of the overall cost of 
living. These results conform to the 'conventional wis- 
don1' and imply that migrants (consumer-voters) prefer 
higher income locations and manifest an aversion to states 
having   higher   living-cost   levels.   Jn   addition,   the 
 
 
 
 
 
attractive to migrants. Next, the estiinated coefficients on 
the COAST dummy variable are both positive, with that in 
estimation (a) being statistically significant at the 5% level 
and that in estimation (b) being statistically significant at 
6o/o level. These results imply that consumer-voters appear 
to prefer living in states v1,1ith greater closeness/access to 
either the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans or the Gulf of Mexico. 
The estimated coefficients on the DENSITY variable in 
estimates (a) and (b) are both negative and statistically 
significant at the 5o/o level. Thus, consumer-voters may 
have an aversion to states having a higher  population 
density. 
Lastly\ we consider the results for the variables reflect- 
ing our expanded interpretation of the Tiebout (1956) 
hypothesis. The coefficient on the variable 
EFSJNCTXRATE) is negative in both estimates and sta- 
tistically significant at the l % level in estimate (a) and at 
the 2.5o/o level in esti1nate (b). Thusi consumer-voters 
appear to have an aversion to higher state personal 
income tax rate levels. In addition, the estiinated coeffi- 
cient on the variable PPUPJLj is positjve and statistically 
significant at the 5°/o level in both estimates. Hence\ 
consumer-voters appear to prefer locating in states com- 
mitting greater financial resources per pupil to prin1ary 
and secondary public education. This 'appreciation' for 
public education prioritization could reflect expected 
direct benefits (for parents with school-age children) 
and/or an awareness of the positive externalities of edu- 
cation. Next\ the coefficient on the property tax variable, 
EFPROPTXRATE), is negative and statistically signifi- 
cant at the l % level in both estimates, implying that 
consun1er-voters prefer  residence  in  states with  lower 
 
 
Table 3.  Correlation matrix 
EMFIN cos EMPLG EFSINCT EFPROPT PPUPJ MEDICAi JAN TE COAS DENS! 
c T R X-RATE X-RATE L D-PR MP T TY 
EMFJNC 1.0 
COST 0.579 1.0 
EMPLGR 0.092 0.1 57 1.0 
EFSJNCTXRATE 0.345 0.235 0.106 1.0 
EFPROPTXRATE 0.067 -0.006 0.375 0.324 1.0 
?PUPIL 0.431 0.543 -0.092 o.400 0.475 1.0 
MEDICAJDPR 0.384 0.259 -0.289 0.245 0.357 0.505 1.0 
JANTEMP -0.235 0.104 0.339 -0.235 0.1 29 -0.253 -0.407 1.0 
COAST -0.230 -0.283 0.283 -0.104 0.241 -0.268 0.284 -0.422 1.0 
DENSITY -0.153 0.123 0.123 0.41 9 0.408 0.389 0.358 -0.043 0.129 1.0 
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Table 4.  2SLS estimates, Equations 2 and 3 
 
(a) (b) 
Dependent variable:    Dependent variable: 
MIG) In MIG} 
R. j.  Cebula and }. R. Clark 
 
The second new variable is a quality of life variable, 
POLLUT], a measnre of the amount of airborne toxic 
particulate matter in state j. The index runs from 1.00 to 
l 00.00. Presumably, the greater 1he level of airborne toxic 
releases in state j , the less appealing move1nent to state j 
Constant 
EMFINC 
COST 
EMPLGR 
EFSINCTXRATE 
EFPROPTXRATE 
PPUPlL 
MED!CAIDPR 
JANTEMP 
COAST 
DENSITY 
F 
85.94 
0.00006**  (2.35) 
-6.38**' (-3.25) 
31.04*** (2.69) 
-24.07***  (-·3.10) 
-20.16*** (-3.07) 
0.023* (2.09) 
0.034** (2.41) 
3.74*** (2.68) 
66.72* (2.18) 
-0.081 * (-2.28) 
5.65** 
4.01 
0.0000005** (2.34) 
-0.036*** (-2.70) 
0.354*** (3.13) 
-0.56** (-2.46) 
-0.15*" (-4.05) 
0.0002* (2.05) 
0.0022* (2.06) 
0.028*** (2.82) 
0.44* (1.97) 
-0.00034* (2.02) 
5.35** 
becomes. 
Given these new variables, the following equations, 
each of which constitutes an extension/re-specification of 
Equation 2, is to be estimated by 2SLS: 
 
MIGj = ao + a ,EMFINCj + a2COST] + a,EMPLGRj 
+a4EFSINCTXRATEj + a5 EFPROPTXRATEj 
+ a6 PPUP!Lj  + a7 MEDICAJDPRj 
+ asJANTEMPj + a9 COAST] + a 10DENSJTYj 
Notes: Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***, ** and * statisti- 
cally  significant  at  the  I %,  2.5%  and 6'o/t1  levels,  respectively; 
#statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
effective property tax rates. All of these 'updated' results 
are generally consistent \Vith most of the other prior/ear- 
lier related studies of the Tiebout  (1956) framework. 
Finally, there is the case of the variable MEDICAJDPR. 
In estimation (a), the coefficient on 1his variable is posi- 
tive and statistically significant at the 2.5% level, 
whereas it is positive and statistically significant at just 
beyond the 5170 level in estirnation (b). These results 
imply that some portion of consumer-voters, presumably 
higher 'at-risk' persons (health-wise), prefer to move to 
states where Medicaid benefits per recipient are higher. 
Thus, there appears to be strong support for 1he Medicaid 
magnet extension of the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
V. Robustness Tests 
 
To test the robustness of the basic model in Table 4, two 
additional variables are included in the model in tvvo new 
+a11 ECONFREEj + u (5) 
 
 
MJGj = ao + a , EMFINCj + a2COST] + a3EMPLGRj 
+ a4EFSINCTXRATEj + a5 EFPROPTXRATEj 
+ a6PPUP!Lj + a7 MEDICAIDPRj 
+ a8JANTEMPj + a9 COASJ} + a 10DENSITYJ 
+ a ,i ECONFREEj + a12POLLUT] + u (6) 
 
 
The 2SLS estimates of Equations 5 and 6 are provided in 
colunms (a) and (b), respectively, of Table 5. Overall. 
1hese two 2SLS estimates yield  23  coefficients.  All  of 
the esthnated coefficients exhibit  the  expected  signs, 
with 15 statistically significant at the I % level, two at the 
2.5% level and five at the 5% level. Only one of the 
estimated coefficients (POLLUT]) fails to be statistically 
significant at the l 0% level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. 2SLS estimates, Equations 5 and 6 
 
(a) (b) 
estilnates. The first is an index of 'economic freedon1', 
ECONFREE, as developed by Ruger and Sorens (2009); 
Ruger and Sorens (2009, p. I) predicate their study ulti- 
mately on the definition of individualfreedom as 'the ability 
to dispose of one's own life, liberty, and justly acquired 
property however one sees fit, so long as one does not 
coercively infringe on another's ability to do the same'. 
They then proceed to develop a number of freedon1indices, 
including an elaborate index of overall economic freedo1n, 
ECONFREE.   They   also   contend   that  the  role   of 
ECONFREE j per se in an empirical migration analysis 
appears to be largely m1studied and argue that domestic 
Constant 
EMF1NC 
COST 
EMPLGR 
EFSINCTXRATE 
EFPROPTXRATE 
PPUPIL 
MEDICAIDPR 
JANTEMP 
COAST 
DENSITY 
ECONFREE 
POLL UT 
F 
-·47.59 
0.000039* (2.01) 
-5.0*** (--3.00) 
30.05*** (2.97) 
-21.86*** (-3.26) 
-20.44*** (-3.45) 
0.035*** (2.86) 
0.032* (2.26) 
3.9**' (3.07) 
61.77* (2.30) 
-0.092*** (-2.76) 
1.57** (2.59) 
 
3.43** 
--41.09 
0.00004* (2.03) 
-5.08*** (-3.03) 
30.07*** (2.94) 
·-22.25*** (-3.30) 
-20.63*** (-3.47) 
0.035*** (2.87) 
0.032** (2.42) 
3.94*** (3.07) 
62.32* (2.31) 
-0.093*** (-2.77) 
1.6*** (2.63) 
-0.166 (-0.46) 
3.37** 
in-migration should be an increasing function of econo1nic 
freedom. 
Notes: Terms in parentheses  are t-values. ***, ** and * statisti- 
cally significant at the  1o/o, 2.5°/o and 5°/o levels, respectively. 
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Aside from the two new variables introduced into the 
basic model (POLLUTi and ECONFREEi ), the results in 
columns (a) and (b) of Table 5 are comparable to those in 
column (a) of Table 4. The coefficient on the variable 
POLLU J]  fails  to be  statistically  significant  at even the 
l 0% level. However, the coefficients on the ECONFREEj 
variable are positive and statistically significant at the 
2.5% level in one case [column (a)] and at the  1% level 
in the other case [column (b)]. Thus, there is evidence that 
higher levels of econo1nic freedo1n do induce higher net 
in-1nigration, 
As for the remaining variables in  Table 5, they are 
extremely close in both n1agnitude and statistical signifi- 
cance to their counterparts in Table 4. Thus, the results from 
the estimation of Equation 2 in column (a) appear to be 
robust. In particular, based on the findings in Tables 4 and 5, 
there is compelling evidence that the net state in-migration 
rate over the study period is an incfeasing function of the 
variables   EMPLGR,   ?PUPIL,   COAST,  JANTEMP, 
EMF/NC and MED!CAIDPR, while being a decreasing 
function of the variables COST, EFSINCTXRATE, 
EFPROPTXRATE and DENSITY. 
Of greatest relevance to this study, the findings in 
Table 5 imply that the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis of voting 
with one's feet and the Medicaid magnet extension thereof 
is strongly supported, with consumer-voters expressing 
their preferences for higher levels of outlays per pupil in 
public primary and secondary education, lower state 
income tax rates, lo\•,rer property taxation and, finally, 
higher levels of Medicaid outlays. The results shown in 
Tables 4 and 5 provide a consistent pattern of support for 
the Medicaid magnet hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
This study has investigated determinants of net in-1nigra- 
tion rates in the United States over the period 2000-2008, 
with the intentions of using contempora1y migration data 
to investigate the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis of voting with 
one's feet and the 'Medicaid 1nagnet hypothesis' exten- 
sion of that hypothesis. The extension argues that states 
implications may be considerable, e.g., in the year 2000, 
there were some 42 887 000 Medicaid recipients (57 757 
000 by 2006) and an approximate aggregate Medicaid 
outlay in the year 2000 of $168.443 billion ($269.868 
billion by 2006) across the United States as a whole (U. 
S. Census Bureau, 201 0, Tables 144, 145). 
Using 2SLS estimation, initially a linear model is esti- 
mated and then a corresponding semi-log model is esti- 
mated (see Table 4). Both the linear and semi-log 
specifications allow for purely economic factors (includ- 
ing an index of the average overall cost of living ln each 
state), quality of life variables and Tiebout (1956)-type 
fiscal factors, one  of which expressly reflects average 
Medicaid benefits per recipient. Subsequently, as robust- 
ness tests, additional estimates are provided. 
Finally, this analysis provides a re-esti1nation of the 
basic model in Equation 2, in which the variable 
MEDICAIDPR is replaced by the maximum Medicaid 
benefit per recipient in state j, MAXMEDICAIDPRj. As 
illustrated by the results shown in Table 6, the overall 
findings are essentially identical to those  in column (a) 
of Table 4, with the estimated coefficient on this new 
maximu1n Medicaid benefit variable being both positive 
and statistically significant at beyond the 5% level. This 
re-specification of the Medicaid variable yields further 
results supportive of the Medicaid magnet hypothesis. 
The results demonstrate that as conswner-voters 1nake 
migration decisions, they tend to move to states with higher 
per pupil outlays on public primary and secondary' educa- 
tion, with lower effective inco1ne tax rates and lower effec- 
tive property tax rates. In addition, some portion of 
consu1ner-voters apparently is attracted to states with higher 
Medicaid benefits. Regarding the latter empirical findings 
invol ving the Medicaid magnet hypothesis and the case of 
the variables MEDJCAIDPR and MAXMEDICAJDPRj, in 
all of the 2SLS estimates, the estimated coefficient on this 
variable is positive and statistically significant. Thus, there 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.  2SLS estimate, revised Equation 2 
Constant 44.84 
with  higher   Medicaid   benefits  per   recipient  atn·act 
n1igrants who are either actually receiving Medicaid ben- 
efits, or are already Medicaid-eligible  or who expect to 
become Medicaid-eligible. Thus,  states that offer higher 
per recipient  Medicaid benefits can in effect act like a 
inagnet  to  such  people.  Fu1ihennore,  those  states with 
the highest  Medicaid  benefits  would  logically  tend  to 
retain their  current residents  who are already Medicaid 
recipients, or who are soon-to-be eligible Medicaid  reci- 
pients, with the end result being that net state in-1nigration 
EMFINC 
COST 
EMPLGR 
EFSINCTXRATE 
EFPROPTXRATE 
?PUPIL 
MAXMEDICAIDPR 
JANTEMP 
COAST 
DENSITY 
F 
0.00006*" (2.35) 
-6.38"* (-3.25) 
31.04*** (2.69) 
-24.07" * (-3.10) 
-20.16"* (-3.07) 
0.023* (2.09) 
O.o3*' (2.34) 
3.74*** (2.68) 
66.72* (2.18) 
-0.081* (-2.28) 
3.35* 
is an increasing function of Medicaid benefits per recipi- 
ent.  If this  hypothesis  is  valid,  the  potential  policy 
Notes: Tem1s in parentheses are t-values. ***, ** and * statisti- 
cally significant at the 1%, 2.5% and 5o/o levels, respectively. 
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appears to be strong empirical support for the Medicaid 
magnet hypothesis. 
Holahan (2007, p. 667) contends that the interstate 
variation in Medicaid spending per lovv-incon1e person 
'has many determinants, including state discretion and 
differences in prices and amounts of services used'. He 
further observes that various 'Incentives in Medicaid to 
have low-income states spend more have generally not 
worked ', yielding 'outcomes that belie a presumed 
national interest in equity'. Thus, a 'federal solution ... 
would be necessary to eliminate state variations' in 
Medicaid spending per recipient. The authors of the pre- 
sent study of the Medicaid magnet hypothesis concede 
potential benefits to a 'federal solution', presumably in the 
form of unifonn Medicaid benefits per low-income person 
nationally. However, it would be argued here that such a 
'uniform' system might very welt_ require interstate 
Medicaid benefits to be adjusted to reflect either interstate 
cost-of-living differentials or interstate medical care price 
differentials in order to establish the equity in which 
Holahan (2007) is interested and in the elimination of the 
Medicaid magnet phenomenon with which the present 
study is concerned. Inother words, real Medicaid benefits 
potentially may have to be made approximately equal 
across the states in order to successfully address these 
concerns. 
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